Multiparty Presidential Systems Research Articles

Coalition Governance under Separation of Powers: Shadowing by Committee in Coalitional Presidentialism

AbstractDo coalition parties in presidential systems shadow one another with an eye on reducing agency loss? Our knowledge of intra‐coalitional delegation under presidentialism remains limited to a few case studies. This article addresses that question using an original data set of committee chairs in eight multiparty presidential systems around the world. It shows that shadowing—the appointment of chairs from one coalition party to committees overseeing portfolios controlled by another coalition party—is a function of the degree of agency loss the coalition expects to a specific party, operationalized in terms of ideological distance as well as the salience of portfolios. However, the data also tentatively suggest that powerful committees reduce rather than increase the incidence of shadowing, which may be attributed to the risk of intraparty agency loss under separation of powers.

Does the Reform of the Parliamentary and Presidential Threshold Strengthen the Presidential System in Indonesia?

The attempt to purify Indonesia's multiparty presidential system was only reflected after the Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution. However, it took work to implement it. In practice. Various measures have been taken, including party alliances and introducing voting barriers in parliamentary elections. Therefore, analysing the relationship between electoral thresholds and their ideal proportions in the form of legal-political reforms to strengthen the Indonesian presidential system is interesting. This is in line with the purpose of this study, which is to uncover and analyse the legal politics of electoral thresholds in an attempt to strengthen the presidential system of government in Indonesia. The approach adopted in this study is a theoretical approach with legal, conceptual, comparative and historical approaches. This study concludes that the legitimate political renewal of the electoral vote threshold is not closely related to efforts to strengthen Indonesia's system of multiparty presidential government. The ideal way to reform the legal, political threshold for electoral votes would be to set the parliamentary threshold at 2.5%, but at the same time tighten controls over the parties participating in the election, and the 2.5% threshold serves as President to maintain a balance between the parliamentary and presidential thresholds. In addition, it is also important to strengthen consensus (consensus democracy) among coalition political parties. There is still a desire to abolish the presidential threshold through the People's Representative Council (DPR) instead of the Constitutional Court (MK).

Zaken Cabinet Map and Presidential Prerogrative in the Perspective of Multiparty Presidential System in Indonesia

Constitutionally, the system of government chosen by the Indonesian people is a presidential system with a multiparty system. This system of government makes the President shackled by political parties when he wants to arrange the cabinet, which is his prerogative. This article will discuss the problem of how the zaken cabinet map of the multiparty presidential system in the perspective of scientific expertise or scientific approach/expertise approach can ve implemented side by side with the interests of coalition political parties in Indonesia. By using normative juridical analysis, it is concluded that the zaken cabinet map of the multiparty presidential system in the perspecive of scientific expertise or scientific approach/expertise approach can be implemented side by side with the interset of coalition political parties in Indonesia with minimum ratio of 32,35% (Thirty-two point thirty-five percent) filled by experts/professionals and the rest can be left to the political parties supporting the president / vice president as a manifestation of “political rewards”

The Implementation of Executive Toolbox during Jokowi-JK Administration in the Post-2014 Presidential Election

This research will look at the dynamics that happened post-presidential election of 2014 in Indonesia, which indicated a divided government in the parliament which caused a deadlock at the beginning of the chosen presidential candidates, Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla, for the 2014 - 2019 period. This was the aftermath of the combination between the presidential system and a multiparty system, which showed the executive-legislative relationship in a multiparty presidential system. It could also reveal the inability of the government and the opposition to reach common ground multiple times. However, the case in Indonesia is quite different and interesting to explore how the government aimed to reach a balance and run their administration. The executives were using the executive Toolbox to offer politically strategic positions for the opposition to join the governmental coalition and to intervene in the internal works of political parties. The approach used for this research was a qualitative design. The concept of divided government which was put forward by Hughes & Carlson (2015), was chosen to be the theoretical framework to analyze the dynamic factors of the case. And the theory of executive toolbox usage by Raile et al. (2011) was used by the writer to analysis the presence of executive power in suppressing the dynamics that happened. The results of the research showed that the usage of the executive Toolbox was part of a response from the regime of Jokowi to create stability in facing the dynamics that happened and to gain the support of the opposite parties in the parliament to join the governmental coalition of 2014-2019’s Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla period. This indicates that the government under Jokowi, which combined a multiparty system and the presidential system, can be considered a success, especially in terms of gaining support from the coalition through the usage of the executive Toolbox.

Legislative Effectiveness in Multiparty Presidential Systems: Evidence from Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies

Legislative Effectiveness in Multiparty Presidential Systems: Evidence from Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies

Problematika Legislasi dalam Sistem Pemerintahan Presidensial Multipartai

This research raises the issue of legislation in the multi-party presidential government system in Indonesia after the amendment to the 1945 Constitution. In order to make this research more focused, the researcher proposes two main questions, namely; How exactly are the legislative problems that occur in a multi-party presidential government system? Likewise, how are the efforts to resolve the legislative problems in a multi-party presidential government system?. To answer these two problems, the researcher uses several approaches in this normative research. Among these approaches are the statutory approach, the conceptual approach, the historical approach and the case approach. Based on the results of the discussion in this study, the researcher concludes two main conclusions related to the problematics of legislation in the multi-party presidential government system in Indonesia after the amendments to the 1945 Constitution. namely, the weakening of the president's power in terms of legislation due to the increasing influence of the DPR's power in the legislative process, even though the president has double role. Furthermore, the legislative problem that occurs in the multi-party presidential system of government in post-amendment Indonesia is the waning spirit of upholding the principle of checks and balances in the formation of legislation.
  

Power-Sharing, Presidential Style: Issue Salience and Portfolio Allocation in Multiparty Presidential Systems

Minority presidents form coalitions to secure legislative support. However, such support comes at the policy cost of delegating power to coalition partners. Given this dilemma, how do presidents decide on portfolio allocation? The argument is that presidents consider ministries' policy relevance and the characteristics of coalition parties when distributing positions. The president will allocate the most important ministries to aligned ministers (seeking policy control) and to the larger coalition parties (seeking legislative support), distributing the least policy-relevant ministries to clientelist parties. The article presents an original measure for policy salience based on topic modeling of presidential addresses and conditional logit models to test the hypotheses. The analysis consists of a comparative study of Brazil, Chile, and Colombia over 24 years. Results indicate that presidents use salience to sort ministries and decide portfolio allocation. This evidence for the president-specific salience argument shows the relevance of considering the qualitative aspects of portfolio allocation in multiparty presidential systems and how presidents share power with coalition partners without losing control over governmental decisions.

‘Congruent We Govern’: Cost of Governance in Multiparty Presidentialism

AbstractThe received wisdom on executive–legislative relations in multiparty presidential systems is that the size of the president's majority in Congress is the key factor explaining governance patterns, particularly the president's legislative success. However, in many cases presidents enjoying a nominal majority have been unable to pass legislation and have faced institutional instability. The article departs from a conventional definition of divided government and focuses on the preference incongruence between the governing coalition and the floor of Congress. It argues that the ideological distance between the floor and the coalition is a key factor explaining the president's cost of governing (which includes factors such as the distribution of cabinet portfolios and budgetary transfers to coalition partners). The article provides an empirical test with data from Brazil that find that the greater the ideological incongruence, the higher the cost of governing for the president.

Informal Coalitions and Legislative Agenda Setting in Mexico’s Multiparty Presidential System

ABSTRACTTo what extent can presidents exert gatekeeping power in opposition-led legislatures? Drawing on a study of roll rates in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, where presidents lack legislative majorities and often face a legislature controlled by the opposition, this article argues that gatekeeping power is divided among multiple actors. It finds that presidents exert weak gatekeeping power over the agenda. While presidents and their parties are rarely defeated in votes related to presidential initiatives, they generally create stable, informal coalitions with opposition parties to pass their bills. Moreover, the agenda-setting power of the president and the president’s party is weaker with bills that originate in the legislative branch, where the party is occasionally rolled on legislative initiatives and during the amendment stage if it is not also the median party.

Law Production in Multiparty Presidentialism: Veto Player Theory and its Application to Korea

AbstractIn this article, I offer a theory of lawmaking in multiparty presidential systems with different legislative institutions. I present a model that combines Krehbiel's pivotal politics theory with Tsebelis's veto players theory. This model simplifies various institutional veto players into the de facto veto players. I analyze the model to explain how the government type (unified versus divided governments), the legislative rules (majoritarian versus supermajoritarian rules), and the party system (two-party versus multiparty systems) affect legislative productivity. I apply the theoretical results obtained to solve the puzzle about the nondifferential legislative performance between unified and divided governments in the National Assembly. I test a hypothesis stating that the distance between the ideological positions of the agenda-setter and the de facto veto players has a negative effect on the proportion of controversial bills enacted between the 16th and the early 21st National Assemblies.

Preaching to the Choir? Presidential Debates and Patterns of Persuasion in a Multiparty Presidential System

Abstract How does institutional context condition debates’ effects on vote choice during electoral campaigns? The literature on the United States suggests that debates’ effects on vote choice are minimal at best, reinforcing voters’ prior convictions more often than converting or activating them. There have been very few tests of debates’ effects in newer democracies, however, and the strong partisan identification among American voters might mean that this lack of impact is specific to the American context. In this article, the effects of presidential debates are tested in a younger democracy with a multiparty system and runoff presidential elections: Brazil. Data come from the Brazilian Electoral Panel Study, a seven-wave panel study conducted before, during, and after the 2014 Brazilian election. To rigorously measure presidential debates’ effect on voters’ likelihood to change candidates, a difference-in-differences regression was estimated with a generalized least squares (GLS) random-effects model. In the end, debates had a significant effect on vote choice in the first round of the 2014 Brazilian presidential election, as respondents who watched first-round debates were more likely to switch candidates after the debates had taken place than those who had not watched the debates. In the second round, however, when the field had been reduced to only two candidates, debates no longer affected voters’ propensity to change candidates.

Vote Switching in Multiparty Presidential Systems: Evidence from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies

Why do legislators switch their votes between the committee and floor stages in multiparty presidential systems? The literature on the US Congress has argued that switches are conditional on cross-cutting pressures by competing principals (i.e., party leaders and interest groups), partisanship, electoral competitiveness, ideology, seniority, and informational updates. This article argues that unlike in the US two-party system, in multiparty systems electoral competitiveness increases the likelihood of switching. Additionally, the practice of switching is more likely for legislators whose competing principals are leaders with conflicting electoral interests. We test these hypotheses analyzing vote switches between committee reports and roll-call votes in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Our results indicate that legislative vote switching indeed behaves differently in multiparty than in a two-party presidential system.

ANALISIS KEKUATAN DEMOKRASI DALAM ERA KOALISI KABINET PASCA REFORMASI 1998 DI INDONESIA

This study is motivated by an analysis of the reality of the multi-party presidential system which is the main aspect of the way back in the governance system in Indonesia, starting from the old order until the reform era in 1998, the plurality structure of the party became a forerunner to the survival of the coalition in the formulation of the Indonesian government cabinet. Consideration that is the prospect of seizing seats in the cabinet coalition is usually focused on the opportunity structure (strategy entry), where the strategy entry refers to the calculation of three important considerations that are political calculations, namely the cost of entering the arena (cost of entry), various benefits (benefits of office), and the possibility of obtaining support from voters (probably of receiving electoral support). In the target of realizing the political goals of the coalition parties, the main approach taken is to develop mutual benefits, namely the benefits of enjoying power. So that in formulating indicators of the success of a democratic country, this study also presents a comparison related to the implementation of a presidential government system in the United States and a parliamentary government system in the United Kingdom that has resulted in a democratic and stable government, as well as realizing a multi-party presidential system as a whole and optimizing dual functions businessman in internal political parties.

Electoral incentives to coalition formation in multiparty presidential systems

Coalition theories of presidential regimes have frequently assumed that coalition formation is a mostly post-electoral phenomenon. We challenge this view by showing that pre-electoral bargaining shapes to a substantial extent minority presidents’ disposition to cooperate with the legislature by forming a majority cabinet. Examining a dataset of pre- and post-electoral coalitions from 18 Latin American countries, we find that majority coalition cabinets are more likely to occur when elected presidents form pre-electoral coalitions (PECs), to the extent that pre-electoral agreements create stronger incentives for cooperation, by relying on a broader set of rewards than any post-electoral agreement. Moreover, we find that the likelihood of majority coalition formation increases as the share of PEC seats increases, thus reducing the need to engage in post-electoral bargaining. Our findings carry important implications for the study of cabinet formation in presidential regimes by introducing pre-electoral agreements as a key determinant of cabinet formation.

IDEAL COMBINATIONS OF GOVERNMENT SYSTEM AND PARTY SYSTEM FOR STABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GOVERNMENT

Indonesia since before independence until the time the core adopted a multi-party system. While the system of government changes, from a presidential, parliamentary, quasi presidential system. Multiparty presidential government systems can disrupt the stability and effectiveness of the government because there must be a coalition of political parties in the government, the preparation of the cabinet by the President must consider and accommodate the interests of coalition political parties, decision making or policy-making must also consider the interests of coalition political parties, so it will require longer time. The coalition of political parties is very fluid and pragmatic, so there may be a change in the coalition because there is a possibility that political parties that were outside the coalition will then enter the government coalition, and vice versa. Exit the entry of political parties in the government coalition will certainly be very disturbing, because political parties who have just joined the government will demand a seat in the government, especially in the cabinet. Unloading pairs of the cabinet or dismantling pairs of government seats will often occur. This of course greatly disrupts the stability and effectiveness of government. Therefore, a presidential government system ideally does not combine with a multi-party system. A change from a multi-party system to a simple multi-party system is needed, or if possible with a two-party system.

Here Today, Gone Tomorrow - Political Ambition, Coalitions, and Accountability as Determinants of Ministerial Turnover in the Brazilian Multiparty Presidential System

The article aims at understanding the determinants of ministerial turnover in presidential systems. There are essentially three key factors that govern the propensity for ministerial turnover in a presidential system: 01. political ambition - reflected in the individual or collective strategies and tactics employed by the party-affiliated actors represented in the cabinet; 02. the presence or absence of a governing coalition - which has bearing on the degree of ideological distance between the president and such political parties as form part of any governing coalition, with consequences for ministerial scrutiny; and 03. accountability - a determinant in responding to such external pressures as may be brought to bear by public opinion. In order to investigate the impacts of these factors, this inquiry seeks to analyze the new and dynamic democracy of Brazil. Brazil's presidential system presents interesting features that make it an excellent laboratory in which to test hypotheses concerning every aspect of ministerial turnover. To this end, this paper employs a multivariate methodology, as well as descriptive and survival analyses, based on a comprehensive and original database of cabinet ministers that draws on three presidencies over five democratically elected governments from 1995 to 2014. Among other results, our most original finding was that there is an inverse correlation between the degree of ministerial politicization (political ambition) and ideological distance from the president during political scandals (interaction between the governing coalition and accountability) on the one hand, and the length of ministerial tenure on the other.

La evolución de los formatos de debates presidenciales en la televisión chilena: 1989-2017: Un caso de especiación

We seek to explain that the evolution of the format of televised presidential debates –in each country– is determined by the interaction between the specific characteristics of the political system and the media system. As a framework, we use Anstead’s (2016) application of the concept of speciation to the evolution of debates in parliamentary systems, together with Stromback’s (2008) scheme for the evolution of mediatization. We applied this scheme to the Chilean case, and we concluded that the original model used –the same one that the United States used until the mid-1990’s– evolved to adapt to a multi-party presidential system and a commercial television system.

Synergy and Harmony of the Presidential System of Multi Parties and Election to Associate Indonesia 2045

One of the agendas and results of the I-IV Amendment to the 1945 Constitution is to strengthen the Presidential system. Strengthening the presidential system synergized with reforming the party and election system must be carried out in order to achieve the objectives of governance and institutions in the framework of Indonesia 2045. The 2019 elections are simultaneously legislative and presidential elections as stipulated in Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections. The purpose of this article, the first simultaneous election should be legislative, presidential and regional head elections simultaneously. Secondly, there are 4 (four) objectives: 1). Effectiveness and efficiency, 2). Righteous democracy, 3). creating a solid and effective government, 4). period (periodization) that is more organized. Using the optics of constitutional law studies, and socio-legal, strengthened and enriched historical studies of presidential, party and election systems in Indonesia and comparisons with the United States, Brazil, Argentina. There are seven recommended strategies offered in the article: 1) Synergizing the Presidential Election, Legislative Elections and Regional Head Elections simultaneously in 2029, 2) Preparing the Draft Law for Regional Head Election Courts, 3) Making a blueprint of the Presidential Institution Bill, 4). Simplify party systems with an electoral threshold, 5). Simplify the number of parties in parliament with parliamentary threshold, 6). Implement a threshold presidential order to create balance in a multi-party presidential system, 7). Make changes to the Election Law and Evaluate the Proposal Election system with the Sainte-Lague calculation method.

PEMILIHAN UMUM SERENTAK DAPAT MEMPERKUAT SISTEM PRESIDENSIAL

The purpose of this research is to find out whether general elections simultaneously have an influence on strengthening presidential systems. To find out the implications of simultaneous elections on elections in Indonesia. The research method in this study uses a normative juridical approach used to study or analyze secondary data in the form of legal materials, especially primary legal materials and secondary legal materials. Primary legal material is the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections, Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 14 / PUU-XI / 2013 etc. Secondary legal materials are those that provide explanations and interpretations of sources of primary legal materials such as law books, legal journals, and others. Tertiary legal materials are legal materials that provide guidance or explanation of primary and secondary legal materials such as legal dictionaries, encyclopedias, and related documents. The results of the study were argued that the holding of elections simultaneously with the plurality system itself actually tended to produce few presidential candidates. When presidential elections the supporters of candidates in this system tend to ignore candidates who are not competitive (non-viable) so they can focus on the top two candidates. This encouraged a coalition process between parties from the start because there was only one election round. The party that should submit its own candidate but the candidate is less competitive tends to drop the candidate and endorse one of the two most competitive candidates. The plurality system, if implemented separately from the legislative elections, the parties in the legislative elections do not need to think about the influence of the presidential election. This plurality mechanism affects parties when carried out simultaneously with legislative elections. The parties tend to nominate one of the two most competitive candidates, and lead to gathering support for the legislative parties in the two candidates. When one of the candidates wins the presidential election, then support for the president in the legislature tends to be the majority or close to the majority. The combination of the presidential plurality election system carried out simultaneously with legislative elections is the most likely to help strengthen multi-party presidential systems. Thus the simultaneous implementation of elections will strengthen the presidential system in which the President and Vice-President are elected to gain strong legitimacy from the people, in order to realize the effectiveness of government and also the support base of the DPR.

Does one size fit all? An analysis of portfolio allocation in the Brazilian multiparty presidential system

Presidents face a dilemma of whom to appoint for cabinet positions. They need to secure legislative support for their government and at the same time achieve their goals in terms of public policy. This work analyzes the portfolio allocation of Brazilian presidents in Brazil’s multiparty system. This study tests some hypotheses using multinomial logistic regression to identify appointment strategies adopted by the presidents in four different governmental sectors from 1990 to 2016. To do so, first, we create an index of ministerial politicization (IMP) and aggregate the ministries in these four sections, employing cluster analysis. The results show that appointments to the core positions in government tend to be less politicized. Moreover, the president’s personal nominations were greater in the presidential units that carry out the political coordination and typical functions of the State.